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JCCAE
21 Feb 74

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18 March 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DCI Briefing of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy - 21 February 1974

1. On 21 February 1974, the Director gave an annual briefing to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The meeting lasted from 1400 hours until 1700 hours. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] A transcript was taken and will be available in the Office of Legislative Counsel. Discussions included Top Secret Restricted Data material.

2. Present from the Committee were:

Representative Melvin Price (D., Ill.), Chairman
Senator Stuart Symington (D., Mo.)
Senator Joseph M. Montoya (D., N.M.)
Senator Wallace F. Bennett (R., Utah)
Senator Peter H. Dominick (R., Colo.)
Representative Craig Hosmer (R., Calif.)
Representative Orval Hansen (R., Idaho)

3. Present from the Committee staff were:

Edward J. Bauser, Executive Director
George F. Murphy, Deputy Director
Al Knight

4. Accompanying the Director were:

Carl Duckett, DDS&T

[REDACTED] OSI

[REDACTED] OCI

George L. Cary, Legislative Counsel

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15 February 1974

DCI CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING FOR
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY
21 February 1974

THE SOVIET UNION AND DETENTE

- I. Mr. Chairman, before discussing Soviet strategic weapons, I would like to say a few words about the Soviet foreign policy developments we have come to call detente. The Russians are still holding to this policy, which is increasingly identified with General Secretary Brezhnev. When we speak of their policy of detente, however, a careful definition is in order.
 - A. Detente does not mean a change of heart. Nor does it mean that Moscow has abandoned its basic objectives.
 1. We see continuity most clearly in the strategic field, as will become evident when I discuss weapons development.
 - B. Detente does mean that the Soviets are seeking advantages in their relationships with the West through a new tactic, to which they have committed considerable effort, and prestige.

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II. This new tactic reflects their realization that they are falling behind in the technological race. They have acknowledged to themselves that, if they are to begin closing the gap between themselves and the West, they need to import and absorb large amounts of Western technology.

A. They are trying to do this in a number of ways. One is normal trade. Another is the project method, in which a Western firm contracts to build and bring into operation an entire plant. A third is the exchange of technological data with individual Western companies.

B. As one measure of this effort, Soviet orders for Western machinery and equipment hit \$2.5 billion last year--a 60 percent increase over 1972. The US is a major recipient of such orders, but we by no means monopolize the field. Only some \$435 million of that \$2.5 billion was placed with American firms.

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C. A second factor in Moscow's new tactic is that it sees China as holding a single-minded hostility toward the USSR.

1. Peking has rebuffed all Soviet overtures for an improvement of Sino-Soviet relations, and the border negotiations remain at square one.
2. China devotes the energies of its new diplomacy to countering Soviet policy in every area of international politics.
3. Moscow realizes that this attitude is not just a peculiarity of Mao's personality, which will disappear when he does.

III. Both the economic factor and the Chinese factor are thus fairly long-term ones, and both work in the same direction on Soviet foreign policy.

A. Obviously, normal and amicable relations with the West are necessary if the Soviets are to promote their economic objectives. Major confrontations over Berlin, or Cuba, or the Middle East would undermine the chances for technological gain.

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B. Tense relations with the West would also expose the USSR to the risk of pressure on two fronts: Western and Eastern. So long as China remains actively hostile, the Soviets have a strong interest in keeping relations with the West on an even keel.

1. In particular, they want to give as little encouragement as possible to cooperation between China and the US--which appears to them as collusion against the Soviet Union.

C. There are positive political incentives as well. Detente provides a useful climate for the extension of Soviet influence in Western Europe. It also promotes the concept of Soviet equality with the US and Moscow's claim of its right to be involved in all international questions, such as the Middle East.

IV. These current priorities have some impact on relations with the US. Moscow is no longer so active and automatic in opposing US policy in every corner of the globe.

A. This has helped, for example, to get a Vietnam settlement and to bring about negotiations

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in the Middle East. It has not, of course, solved major problems in either area, nor do the Soviets intend to do that.

B. Brezhnev's personal prestige is committed to detente. Last year he made his biggest gains with his trips to Bonn and Washington.

1. All Brezhnev's politburo colleagues now acknowledge his preeminent position but he is aware he cannot get too far ahead of them, and must show some fruits of detente.

2. Coping with Solzhenitsyn and other dissidents poses a continuing dilemma of how to square the needs of domestic discipline with foreign policy considerations.

C. Record grain production led the economy to a comeback from a dismal 1972 showing, but Moscow's goal of overtaking the US remains as distant as ever. The USSR still produces only about half as much as the US with a labor force 50 percent larger.

V. Logically, detente should also lead to a further easing of the arms race. But this has not happened

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yet. The Soviet strategic programs which I shall describe do not violate the SALT agreements, but they represent a powerful competitive thrust in the areas not covered by those agreements, mainly in the area of qualitative improvement.

- A. Thus far, Moscow seems to believe that it can proceed on a vigorous program of weapons modernization while simultaneously getting the political and economic benefits of detente.
- B. The Russians will probably continue on this course unless they are persuaded of two things:
 - that if they try to push past a relationship of strategic equality, they will provoke US reactions which will deny them any strategic gain and perhaps even worsen their position; and
 - that Soviet restraint would be reciprocated on terms that would give the USSR both the image and the substance of equality.

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